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Abstract
We provide a tight bound on the amount of experimentation under the
optimal strategy in sequential decision problems. We show the applicability of
the result by providing a bound on the cut-off in a one-arm bandit problem.
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1 Introduction
A basic issue faced by the statistician in sequential decision problems is the trade-off
between the cost of pursuing the experimentation and the informational benefit from
doing so. For instance, in bandit problems, the decision maker chooses whether to
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pull an apparently optimal arm, or to pull some seemingly poorer one, in the hope of
thereby getting valuable information.
Such problems lead to unwieldy analytical problems, rarely amenable to closed-
form solutions, which is arguably one reason why sequential methods are still seldom
relied upon in practice (see Lai (2001), Armitage (1975)). For bandit problems, while
the optimal strategy is well characterized and consists in pulling the arm with highest
dynamic allocation index (Gittins and Jones (1974), Gittins (1979)), the explicit
computation of these indices is rarely feasible, except for very specific cases where
the risky arm yields a Bernoulli payoff (see for instance Bradt, Johnson and Karlin
(1956), Feldman (1962), Woodroofe (1979), Berry and Fristedt (1985)).
Over the years, a number of approaches have been pursued: (i) computing ap-
proximate solutions of the corresponding dynamic programming equation, as in Berry
(1972) or Fabius and van Zwet (1970); (ii) relying on close-by problems for which ex-
plicit solutions are known, as in Lai (1987); (iii) using extensively numerical computa-
tions, as in Lai (1988, for sequential testing of composite hypotheses); (iv) designing
ad hoc policies, sometimes investigating their performance numerically, as in Corn-
field, Halperin and Greenhouse (1969), Berry and Sobel (1973), Berry (1978) and,
more recently, (v) finding explicit a priori bounds, as in Brezzi and Lai (2000).
This note contributes to the last category. Motivated by economic applications,
(see, e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Bolton and Harris (1999), Bergemann and
Va¨lima¨ki (2000), Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille
(2007)), we consider general Bayesian, discounted sequential problems. The param-
eter θ has an initial distribution P (the belief of the economic agent). The agent
repeatedly receives some information, chooses an action from a set A, and get a
possibly unobserved instantaneous reward u(θ, a). Future gains are discounted by
a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Given a decision rule σ, and a stage n, we define the
amount of experimentation in stage n to be the difference ∆n between the currently
highest reward, and the current reward obtained when using σ.
We show that, for every optimal decision rule, the expected value of
+∞∑
n=1
∆n does
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not exceed Cδ/(1 − δ), where C is a bound1 on the reward function u. The bound
is valid irrespective of the prior belief P, and no matter how information flows in to
the decision maker. This result was used in Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2009) to
show that the limit payoff of neighbors in connected social networks coincides, and
to provide conditions that ensure concensus.
We next show, by means of an example, that this bound is tight. We also illustrate
how to use this bound in practice to derive a priori estimates for specific sequential
problems. For simplicity, we focus on an instance of a one-arm bandit problem, for
which no explicit solution is available, and give an estimate of the optimal boundary
in the associated optimal stopping problem. In contrast to Brezzi and Lai (2000),
who provide a bound on the Gittins’ index in bandit problems, our bound is on the
cut-off of the optimal strategy.
2 Setup and Results
The parameter set2 is a measurable space (Θ,A), endowed with a prior distribution
P. At each stage n ≥ 1, a decision maker first gets an observation drawn from
a (measurable) set S, then chooses an action a out of a (compact metric) set A,
and gets a reward u(θ, a). The decision maker discounts future rewards at the rate
δ ∈ [0, 1). The reward function u : Ω×A→ R is (jointly) measurable, and continuous
w.r.t. a. In addition, we assume that the highest reward u : θ 7→ maxa∈A u(θ, a) and
the lowest reward u : θ 7→ mina∈A u(θ, a) have finite expectation.
We stress that we place no restriction whatsoever on the nature of observations:3
e.g., they may depend, possibly in a random way, on the parameter θ, and on past
observations and actions; they may or may not reveal past rewards; and they may be
independent or not.
1In particular,
∑
∆n <∞ a.s., hence any optimal decision rule eventually stops to experiment.
2In spite of the qualifier “parameter”, our decision problems are non-parametric, since the space
Θ is fully general.
3Beyond the minimal, technical assumption that the observation in stage n is drawn according
to a transition probability from Θ× (S ×A)n−1 to S.
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Note that we assume that the current reward is a deterministic function u(ω, a)
of the parameter ω and of the action a. This assumption is made without loss of gen-
erality. Statistical models such as multi-armed bandit problems, where the decision
maker observes her current reward that randomly depends on θ (and on a), can be
cast into the above framework. Indeed, it suffices to re-label such a random reward
as the “observation”, and to define the reward to be the expectation of the “observa-
tion”. Such a change does not affect the optimal decision rules, nor the optimal value
of the problem.
For a decision 4 rule σ, Pσ is the joint distribution of θ and of the infinite sequence
of observations and decisions. Expectation w.r.t. Pσ is denoted by Eσ.
We focus on the amount of experimentation that optimal decisions entail. To be
specific, let a decision rule σ be given. Given a stage n, we denote by Hn the informa-
tion available at stage n, that is, the σ-field induced by past observations and actions.
When using the decision rule σ prior to stage n, the expectation Eσ[u(θ, a)|Hn] is the
expected reward when choosing a in stage n, given all available information, and
un := maxa∈A Eσ[u(θ, a)|Hn] is the myopically optimal reward. Thus, letting an de-
note the action of the decision maker in stage n, un = Eσ[u(θ, an)|Hn] is the actual
reward that the decision maker expects to get in stage n, when following σ. The
difference ∆n := un − un provides a measure of the degree of experimentation per-
formed in stage n. The infinite sum
∑
n≥1
∆n therefore measures the overall amount of
experimentation.
Theorem 2.1 For any optimal decision rule σ, one has
Eσ
[∑
n≥1
∆n
]
≤ (E [u]−E [u])×
δ
(1− δ)
.
Beyond quantitative implications, this bound also yields qualitative implications.
Consider for instance a multi-arm bandit problem. For simplicity, assume that the
types of the various arms are first drawn, and that each arm then yields a sequence
4That is, a sequence (σn) of measurable functions, where σn : (S×A)
n−1×S → A is the decision
in stage n.
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of rewards, which is conditionally i.i.d. given its type. For concreteness, assume that
with probability 1 over the types, the expected outputs of the arms are all distinct.
Observe that, whenever the decision maker pulls a specific arm infinitely often,
she eventually learns the type of this arm. Therefore, whenever the decision maker
pulls two specific arms infinitely often, she eventually learns both types. Since one
of these two arms is “better” than the other, this implies that the sequence (∆n)n≥1
then does not converge to zero. By Footnote 1, this event must have probability 0,
for every optimal decision rule. In other words: any optimal allocation rule samples
finitely often all arms but one. This provides an alternative proof of Theorem 2 in
Brezzi and Lai (2000).5
We next show that the bound in Theorem 2.1 is tight.
Proposition 2.2 For every ε and for every discount factor δ, there is a decision
problem with an optimal decision rule σ such that Eσ[
∑
n≥1∆n] ≥ (E[u¯] − E [u]) ×
δ
(1− δ)
× (1− ε).
The decision problem in Proposition 2.2 depends both on ε and on δ. The next
proposition improves in this respect, at a slight cost in the speed of convergence. In
this statement, and given ε > 0, we denote by N(ε) the (random) number of stages
in which ∆n is at least ε: N(ε) := |{n ≥ 1 : ∆n ≥ ε}|. Plainly,
∑
n≥1
∆n ≥ εN(ε) for
every ε > 0.
Proposition 2.3 There is a decision problem such that for every δ > 2/3 there is a
unique optimal decision rule σ that satisfies
lim
ε→0
εαEσ [N(ε)] = +∞, for every α < 1.
That is, as ε decreases, the expected number Eσ[N(ε)] of experimentation stages
increases faster than 1/εα, for every α < 1.
5Brezzi and Lai (2000) assumes that the states of the different arms are independent. Our
argument dispenses with this assumption.
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3 Proofs
3.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Consider an optimal decision rule σ. Set Yn := (1− δ)
+∞∑
k=n
δk−nEσ[uk | Hn]: Yn can be
interpreted as the continuation reward under the optimal decision rule (discounted
back to stage n). Since uk ≤ Eσ[u | Hk] for all k ≥ n, one has Eσ[Yn] ≤ E[u].
Since one option available to the decision maker, from stage n on, is to ignore all
future observations, and to keep choosing the action that was myopically optimal in
stage n, we have
Yn ≥ un. (1)
Now, rewrite Yn as
Yn = (1− δ)un + δEσ[Yn+1 | Hn]
= (1− δ) (un −∆n) + δEσ[Yn+1 | Hn]. (2)
From (1) and (2) we obtain:
un ≤ (1− δ) (un −∆n) + δEσ[Yn+1 | Hn],
so that after cancelling un from both sides and dividing by δ,
un ≤ Eσ [Yn+1 | Hn]−
∆n(1− δ)
δ
. (3)
Substituting (3) into (2), we obtain
Yn ≤ (1− δ)
(
Eσ [Yn+1 | Hn]−∆n
(
1− δ
δ
+ 1
))
+ δEσ [Yn+1 | Hn]
≤ Eσ [Yn+1 | Hn]−
1− δ
δ
∆n.
Taking expectations, summing over n = 1, . . . , k, using E [u] ≤ Eσ[Yn] ≤ E [u], and
taking the limit as k goes to infinity, we obtain
Eσ
[∑
n≥1
∆n
]
≤ (E[u]−E[u])×
δ
(1− δ)
,
as desired.
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3.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Fix δ > 0. Note that if the statement holds for ε0, then it holds for every ε > ε0. We
will prove that the statement holds for ε = 1/m, for any natural number m > 1/δ.
Let Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θm} and A = {a0, a1, . . . , am} contain m and m + 1 elements
respectively. The prior belief on Θ is uniform, and the reward function is given by :
u(θk, ak) = 1, k = 1, . . . , m, (4)
u(θk, al) = 0, k = 1, . . . , m, l 6= k, (5)
u(θk, a0) = 0, k = 1, . . . , m. (6)
Thus, once the parameter is inferred with certainty, there is a unique optimal action,
whereas ex ante, a1, . . . , am are all myopically optimal, while a0 is (1/m)-suboptimal.
Information is provided to the decision maker according to the following rules: if
the decision maker has chosen a0 in all previous stages, the true parameter is revealed
with probability c := (1−δ)
δ(m−1)
< 1; if the decision maker did not choose a0 in all previous
stages, no information is revealed, that is, no observation is made. Suppose the
decision maker chooses a0 until the state of the world is revealed, and then switches
to the optimal action. The expected reward A satisfies A = cδ + (1 − c)δA, so that
A = cδ
1−(1−c)δ
. Substituting c = (1−δ)
δ(m−1)
we obtain that the expected reward is 1/m, so
that this strategy is optimal. However, for ε = 1/m one has:
Eσ
[∑
n≥1
∆n
]
= Eσ[εN(ε)] =
ε
c
=
m− 1
m
δ
1− δ
.
Since u¯ = 1 and u = 0 we get the desired result.
3.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
We provide an example within the class of Gaussian models. Set Θ = R, and let
the action set A = R ∪ {−∞,+∞} be the set of extended real numbers, endowed
with the usual topology. The reward function u(θ, a) is equal to one if a ∈ R and
|θ − a| ≤ 1, and equal to zero otherwise.
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Given a normal distribution µ with precision ρ (that is, with variance 1/ρ), define
u¯(ρ) to be the highest reward that the decision maker may achieve, when holding
the belief µ. Observe that u¯(ρ) does not depend on the mean of µ. Plainly, the map
ρ 7→ u¯(ρ) is continuous and increasing, with limρ→0 u¯(ρ) = 0, and limρ→+∞ u¯(ρ) = 1.
The signalling structure of the decision problem is designed in such a way that
the decision maker’s belief is always a normal distribution. In addition, she keeps
receiving additional information about θ as long as she follows a pre-specified sequence
of suboptimal actions.
To be specific, let (εn)n≥1 be a decreasing sequence of positive numbers that
satisfies (i)
∑∞
n=1 εn ∈ (1/2, 1), (ii) εnn
β → +∞, for every β > 1, and6 (iii) εn−1
εn
> 2
3
.
The sequence (ρn)n≥1 is defined recursively by the condition
u¯(ρ1 + · · ·+ ρn) = ε1 + · · ·+ εn.
Let the prior distribution P be a normal distribution with precision ρ1, and let
(ξn)n≥2 be a sequence of independent normally distributed variables with precision
ρn, and independent from θ.
Observe that, in the absence of any information about θ, the decision maker’s
myopically optimal reward is u¯(ρ1) = ε1. We set a1 = +∞. On the other hand, if
she receives the observations sk := θ + ξk, k = 2, · · · , n (n ≥ 2), her belief over θ
is normally distributed, with precision ρ1 + · · ·+ ρn. Hence, her myopically optimal
reward is u¯(ρ1 + · · ·+ ρn) = ε1 + · · ·+ εn, and there is an action an (which depends
on s2, . . . , sn), which yields an expected reward equal to ε1 + · · · ,+εn−1.
We now define the information received by the decision maker:
• Prior to stage 1, the decision maker receives no observation;
• Prior to stage 2, she receives the observation s2 = θ+ ξ2 if she played a1 = +∞
at the first stage, and no observation otherwise;
• Prior to stage n > 2, she receives the observation sn = θ + ξn if she played
a1, a2, . . . , an−1 at the previous stages. Otherwise, she receives no observation.
6For instance, choose εn =
(n ln2 n)−1P
∞
k=1
(k ln2 k)−1
for n sufficiently large.
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Playing the sequence (an) of actions is the unique optimal decision rule. Indeed,
if the decision maker first deviates from that sequence at stage k ≥ 1, she receives no
further information, hence her optimal reward in all later stages is ε1+ · · ·+ εk; if she
sticks to the sequence (an), her continuation reward (discounted back to stage k) is
(1− δ)
∞∑
n=k
δn−k(ε1 + · · ·+ εn−1).
By (iii), this reward is higher than ε1 + · · ·+ εk.
Note that an is (myopically) εn-optimal, for each n ≥ 1. Since the sequence (εn)
is decreasing, there are exactly n rounds in which the decision maker does not play
a myopically εn-optimal action, so that by (ii) (εn)
αN(εn) = n(εn)
α converges to
infinity for every α < 1.
4 Application
We here illustrate how Theorem 2.1 can be used to derive a priori bounds on the
optimal decision rules in specific decision problems. Since our goal is here purely
illustrative, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of a specific one-arm bandit prob-
lem, where the risky arm has two possible types, a good type and a bad type, and
observations are i.i.d. In such a problem, the optimal decision rule consists of pulling
the risky arm as long as the posterior probability assigned to the good type exceeds
a specific cut-off, and then in switching permanently to the safe arm.
We set the problem so as to depart as little as possible from a Bernoulli problem,
for which a closed form expression for the optimal cut-off is known. We also make no
attempt at optimizing our final bound.
The type θ of the risky arm takes values in the two-point set {θ0, θ1}. Both types
are ex ante equally likely. The safe arm yields zero. Given θ = θi, the risky arm
may yield three different rewards, a, b and c, with probabilities pia, p
i
b and p
i
c. These
probabilities are such that (i) the expected reward of the risky arm is 1 if θ = θ1, and
−1 if θ = θ0; (ii) one has ln
p1a
p0a
= α, ln
p1b
p0b
= 2α, and ln
p1c
p0c
= −α, for some α > 0.
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Denote by pin the posterior belief that θ = θ1, based on all observations prior to
stage n, and let Zn = ln
pin
1− pin
be the log-likelihood ratio. Conditional on θ = θ0,
the sequence (Zn) follows a random walk, which moves up by α (with probability p
0
a),
by 2α, or moves down by α between any two stages.
The optimal decision rule consists in pulling the risky arm until the first stage σ∗
where Zn = −k
∗α, for some k∗ ∈ N, and then in pulling repeatedly the safe arm. We
will derive an upper bound on k∗ using Theorem 2.1.
The amount of experimentation in stage n is ∆n = max{0, 1/2−pin}. For k < k
∗,
let N(k) be the number of passage of the sequence (Zn) at the level −kα, and denote
by ε(k) = 1/2−
e−kα
1 + e−kα
the corresponding value of ∆n. Thus,
+∞∑
n=1
∆n =
∑
k<k∗
ε(k)N(k). (7)
Observe now that whenever Zn = −kα, the expected number of visits (including
stage n) to −kα before Zn moves below −kα is 1/(1− p
0
a). On the other hand, it is
then the case that the sequence (Zn) moves down to −(k+1)α. Hence, the probability
that (Zn) will move back to −kα before hitting −k
∗α is7 at least p0a. Therefore,
Eθ0[N(k)] ≥
p0a
1− p0a
. (8)
By Theorem 2.1 one has
1
2
Eθ0
[
+∞∑
n=1
∆n
]
+
1
2
Eθ0
[
+∞∑
n=1
∆n
]
≤
2δ
1− δ
. Therefore, (7)
and (8) yield
k∗−1∑
k=0
1
2
1− e−kα
1 + e−kα
=
k∗−1∑
k=0
ε(k) ≤ 4
1− p0a
p0a(1− δ)
, (9)
By monotonicity, the left-hand side of (9) is at least equal to
1
2
∫ k∗−1
0
tanh
xα
2
dx =
1
α
ln cosh
α(k∗ − 1)
2
≥
1
α
ln
e
α(k∗−1)
2
2
=
(k∗ − 1)
2
−
ln 2
α
.
7This bound is admittedly very crude.
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Thus,
k∗ ≤ 4
(
1 + 2
ln 2
α
+ 2
1− p0a
p0a(1− δ)
)
.
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